FREEDOM AND HOPE IN THE MULTIDETERMINED UNIVERSE

Considering the social implications of the issue of free will (Hook, 1958; Lefcourt, 1973), it would seem unwise to reach premature conclusions. Considering the convergence of interest on this issue by theoretical physics and theoretical psychology, any conclusions at this time would seem to be premature. In physics, the question of freedom arises due to the indeterminism inherent in quantum mechanics (Brandt, 1973; Wheeler, 1974). In psychology, the question arises in considerations of the nature of conscious experience (Globus, 1973; Mackay, 1967). Both cases seem to depend critically on the distinction between objective and subjective frames of reference.

Classical physics assumed that the universe has completely specifiable characteristics unaffected by the act of observation (Brandt, 1973). This view is based on an objective frame of reference, one outside the system being conceived. Even given this strongly deterministic view, it can be argued that the concept of freedom is meaningful (Carnap, 1966; Mackay, 1967). However, the discovery of quantization of energy with all its implications has made such a view untenable (Brandt, 1973; Wheeler, 1974).

At the microphysical level, exact specification is impossible and only probabilistic descriptions can be used. Heisenberg pointed out that the uncertainty invo‑1‑ved in microphysical measurements is due to the effect of the observer. The very act of measuring introduces uncertainty in regard to other characteristics of the event being measured (Brandt, 1973; Wheeler, 1974). This view is based on a subjective frame of reference, one that is within the system being conceptualized, in particular the frame of reference of the observer. Conceptions of the future from a subjective frame of reference, as suggested by Everett, must be probabilistic. There are many possible future states of the universe, and there is an inherent uncertainty as to which of these states will occur (Everett, 1957). One of the implications of this view is that like Janus, we may have brain processes complementary to memory for probabilistic modeling of the future. Such mechanisms could be the basis for the concepts of plans (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960) and expectancies (Tolman and Brunswik, 1935). As for the issue of freedom, quantum mechanics makes this a central problem of science as indicated by Wheeler's (1974) statement, "On no question do the limits of error encompass a wider range of uncertainty than on the importance of life and mind for the constitution of the world. Zero? Or Everything?"(p. 688).

While the physicist's studies of the universe have led to the mind, the psychologist’s study of mind has led to the universe. Globus (1973) has pointed out that the problem of mind can be fully appreciated only by considering both subjective and objective frames of reference, and that these perspectives are complementary. He distinguishes between pure events and event-embodying structures. A pure event is any change in an event-embodying structure such as the brain (it may well be that event embodiment is a property of the whole body and not exclusively of the brain, but in any event the brain is clearly involved). Pure events have a subjective frame of reference, a perspective proximal to a transformation boundary such as occurs in the sensory receptor mechanisms of the brain, and as such cannot represent their own embodiment. An objective frame of reference, one which is distal to all transformation boundaries, can only represent events as they are embodied, not as pure events. Thus, mind or pure events and brain or event-embodying structure represent symmetrical and complementary accounts of reality.

Globus (1973) additionally considers a logical implication of this view of the mind­/body problem which is the possibility of neither pure events nor physically embodied events - a homogeneous, undifferentiated "neutral reality". Events and their embodiments can be viewed as perturbations which structure the neutral reality. Globus (1973) also points out that, "Just as we ultimately must come to pure events in considering the unique event‑embodying structure of the brain, so must we ultimately come to pure events in considering the event-embodying structure of the cosmos" (p.  1135).

I would like to tentatively suggest an extension of these arguments to the issue of freedom. Typically, in considerations of sensory function the events distal to the transformation boundary are viewed as causing the changes in the event‑embodying structure of the brain, thus giving rise to the pure events of experience. However, this is only a partial account, including only the objective perspective. From a subjective frame of reference, the universe distal to all possible transformation boundaries can be seen as embodying the events occurring proximal to these transformation boundaries. Taking into account both complementary perspectives, the question of causality seems meaningless. Rather, conscious entities seem to be the focal points for structuring of the universe, serving as either sink or source of structure depending on which perspective is taken.

However, the quantum principle would seem to dictate that scientific knowledge must of necessity take a subjective frame of reference. From this perspective, the universe embodies the events proximal to all possible transformation boundaries, which events include the pure events of experience embodied by our brains. Thus, from the human point of view, the very structure of the universe is determined by multiple sources, including us, although the extent of our influence is still to be discovered. The term multidetermined may be useful to describe this view.  Clearly, freedom and hope have meaning if the universe is multidetermined.  But, in any event, there is hope for true freedom and this remains one of the fundamental unresolved issues of science.

REFERENCES

Brandt, L.W.  The physics of the physicist and the physics of the psychologist. Inter. J. Psychol., 1973, 8, 61‑72.

Carnap,  R. Philosophical foundations of physics. N.Y.: Basic Books, 1966.

Globus, G.G.  Unexpected symmetries in the "world knot". Science, 1973, 180, 1129­1136.

Hook, S. (ed.)  Determinism and freedom in the age of modern science. N.Y.: New York Univ. Press, 1958.

Lefcourt, H.M.  The function of the illusions of control and freedom. Amer. Psychol., 1973, 28, 417‑425.

MacKay, D.M.  Freedom of action in a mechanistic universe. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967

Miller, G.A., Galanter,  E. and Pribram, K.H.  Plans and the structure of behavior. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

Tolman, E.C.  and Brunswik, E. The organism and the causal texture of the environment. Psychol. Rev., 1935, 42, 43‑77.

Wheeler, J.A.  The universe as a home for man. Amer. Scientist, 1974, 62, 683-­691.

© 2003 Robert F. Sarmiento, Ph.D.